murdoch vs crikey - an ordinary australian

In August 2022, Lachlan Murdoch commenced defamation proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia against Private Media Pty Ltd, the publisher of the online outlet Crikey. The case arose from an opinion article authored by Crikey’s political editor, Bernard Keane, addressing the Murdoch family’s media influence and its perceived role in coverage of the 6 January 2021 attack on the United States Capitol.

Defamation Law Applied Without Status

The proceeding attracted immediate public attention, not because of any novel point of law, but because of the identity of the plaintiff. Murdoch is chief executive of Fox Corporation and co-chair of News Corp. Nonetheless, the claim was framed squarely within the ordinary operation of Australian defamation law. No special pleading was advanced. The cause of action relied on the same statutory framework available to any individual who considers their reputation to have been harmed. That symmetry became one of the defining features of the case.

The Publication and the Complaint

The article at the centre of the dispute was expressly presented as commentary. It did not purport to report new facts. It addressed the Murdoch family’s media holdings, Fox News coverage of Donald Trump, and the broader political consequences of that coverage in the lead-up to the Capitol riot.

Murdoch alleged that, despite its opinion framing, the article conveyed defamatory imputations about him personally. In particular, he contended that it suggested he had engaged in criminal conduct, including conspiring with former President Trump to undermine the 2020 United States election and incite the events of 6 January.

From Murdoch’s perspective, the legal issue was straightforward. Opinion did not immunise publication.

If the article conveyed imputations of serious criminal wrongdoing, and if those imputations were false and damaging, the publication was actionable.

Private Media took a markedly different view. It characterised the article as political commentary on matters of public interest, employing rhetorical language and historical analogy. The publisher maintained that a reasonable reader would not understand the article as asserting literal criminal conduct by Murdoch.

In its framing, the piece fell squarely within protected political discourse.

Attitudes to the Law

The posture of each party reflected different attitudes to the same statutory framework.

Murdoch’s approach was conventional and restrained. He relied on the core elements of defamation: publication, defamatory meaning, and reputational harm. His pleadings did not seek to expand the law. Instead, they emphasised that the law applies equally, regardless of the prominence of the plaintiff or the scale of their media influence.

This was a notable feature. The plaintiff did not argue that Murdoch’s position as a global media executive required special treatment. To the contrary, the claim implicitly accepted that the same legal standards that constrain Murdoch-owned media entities also protect Murdoch personally.

Private Media’s defence, by contrast, leaned heavily into the post-reform defamation landscape. It invoked the statutory public interest defence introduced under the Stage 1 defamation reforms, along with honest opinion and constitutional considerations around political communication.

The defence was framed as a test case for how far political commentary could go when addressing powerful individuals and global events. In this sense, the defendant positioned itself as advancing the values underpinning the reforms: robust debate, protection of public interest journalism, and resistance to defamation law being used to chill commentary.

Key Procedural Moments

The litigation progressed through interlocutory stages rather than substantive hearings. Murdoch issued a concerns notice. The article was briefly taken down and then republished. Proceedings were commenced. Pleadings were exchanged.

At an early stage, Murdoch sought to narrow the scope of the public interest defence. Private Media resisted. Justice Wigney declined to strike out the defence, holding that it was arguable and should be tested at trial.

That ruling became a focal point. For Murdoch, it represented a procedural step rather than a merits determination. For Private Media, it was framed publicly as validation of its editorial stance.

Throughout this phase, no evidence was tested. No findings were made about defamatory meaning or harm. The matter remained, procedurally, a live dispute awaiting trial.

Discontinuance

In April 2023, Murdoch discontinued the proceedings. A notice of discontinuance was filed in the Federal Court, bringing the litigation to an end before trial.

The discontinuance carried no admission. No judgment was delivered. The court did not determine whether the article was defamatory or whether any defence would have succeeded. Costs followed the event.

The absence of a merits determination is critical to understanding the case’s significance. The law was not changed. No precedent was set. Yet the matter remains instructive.

Professional Significance

The case demonstrates how Australia’s defamation laws operate when stripped of symbolism.

A media executive commenced proceedings as an individual plaintiff. A small digital publisher defended the claim using statutory defences available to all publishers. The court applied neutral procedural rules.

The litigation ended without adjudication.

The significance lies in what the case did not do. It did not elevate Murdoch above the law, it did not immunise commentary because of its political flavour. It did not resolve the tension between opinion and imputation. Instead, it illustrates a system in which status confers no procedural advantage, and where both concentration of media power and criticism of that power are mediated through the same legal framework.

Professional Significance

The Lachlan Murdoch v Private Media proceeding stands as a contemporary example of defamation law operating without regard to prominence. It underscores that opinion journalism remains legally contestable, that public interest defences must still be proven, and that plaintiffs with substantial media influence must engage the law on the same terms as any other litigant.

While no precedent emerged, the case reinforces a core proposition of Australian defamation law: reputation is protected by uniform rules, and those rules apply equally to media owners, journalists, publishers, and private individuals alike.

Authored by Campbell Dore

Publisher

The Brief

campbell@thebrieflaw.com.au